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EU Policies in time of coronavirus crisis1 
Danai-Georgia Koutsopoulou2 
Abstract  
This paper seeks to uncover the link between the current crisis in the field of migration and asylum policies 
and the rise of populist polarization in Europe. Provided that normative consistency serves effectiveness, 
the study reflects on the existing literature, selected legislative acts, and cases. Hence, criticism against the 
European Union’s heterodetermination and inertia in the political debate is simmering. Populist phenomena 
all over the spectrum define the supranational policymaking, outweighing voices of inclusion and 
democracy, if not the very essence of the Union’s value-based system. Contrariwise, liberal democracy shall 
not only be capable of defending itself and including the alien when the fears come true but also educating 
its citizens in the democratic realm before enforcement promptitude is practically imperative.  All in all, 
primary and secondary legal norms entail adequate solutions to address the issue institutionally, subject to 
political determination, and courage.  
Introduction  
Petitio principii (εν αρχή αιτήσθαι, circulus in probando) describes a logical fallacy where the 
sentence to be proven is already included implicitly or explicitly in the hypothesis. Since the very 
basis of the argument needs confirmation itself, it is questionable how a contested hypothesis can 
extort a sound conclusion (multiple queries fallacy).  
The vicious circle (fallacy of many queries) tends to avoid questing the hypotheses in a way that 
eventually “there is as much evidence pending as is necessary for the conclusion itself”. This variant 
is missing a sound statement and thus its circular reasoning is not understood. 
Using Aristoteles’ logical tools, the subsequent analysis explores the legal implications of populism 
and the immigration crisis within the European Union (EU). Since the study focuses on the 
constitutional viewpoint of these variants, it presumably coheres better to work on the legislative 
acquis and the relevant case law, notwithstanding programme documents, political declarations, if 
relevant. The aim is to uncover the inconsistency and retrogression of the Union between liberal 
democracy and populism. The main reasons therefore are not only the vast systematic divergence 
among the Member States but also the inertia of the institutions and the Court towards clear theses 
and straightforward commitments.  
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The fallacy would roughly be as follows:  
- The Union is “founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which 
pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and 
men prevail” (Treaty of the European Union, 2012: Article 2). 
- The procedure of Article 7 TEU addressing contravention to the above values at the domestic 
level has been instigated only in two cases, against Poland (European Commission, 2017) and 
against Hungary (European Parliament, 2018). No other measure or statement unambiguously 
expresses disapproval of the domestic political parties' rhetoric or actions.   
- The Union’s populism yardstick, if any, is very limited to two Member States, and it does not 
profoundly affect the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, since only in the Hungarian case 
scarce concerns about fundamental rights of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees were 
addressed (Morijn, 2019: 622).  
There is an important agenda of democratic reform left aside, in order to deal with a substantially 
illusionary scare-gun (Howse, 2019). The brief’s conception builds upon this reasoning pattern to 
prove the EU’s myopia and explain that the ceaseless forbearance of the institutions does not enhance 
unity but instead endangers the entire integration process, liberal democracy and the position of 
individual. Consequently, the EU is not self-evidently a Union based on the rule of law, but needs to 
repeatedly prove this, especially when such challenges become so apparent, as in the current phase.  
Part I includes all necessary background in terms of terminology, norms, as well as facts, whereas 
Part II underlines the fallacies by way of exemplary depictions in the legislation and the 
jurisprudence. The last Part concludes and offers a more optimistic view of the issue based on the 
historical evidence of the successful overcoming of wars and crises in the European region. Besides, 
there is a very adequate legal regime and constitutional legacy, subject to sincere and brave 
enforcement. 
Approach and Results  
Yet apart from the fact that several populist coalitions have appeared in the political arena, their 
practical significance regarding decision-making and the general orientation of EU Immigration and 
Asylum Law has not luckily been equivalent. This does not mean that there is no real populist threat 
nor that there have not occurred certain ambiguous backslides towards nativism. It is argued that the 
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EU has maintained a phobic stance risking its value-based system instead of bravely confronting 
Member States incompliance. Notwithstanding the CJEU’s significant effort to balance interests and 
tame confrontations, the following analysis suggests that there is a case of auto-censorship stemming 
from the overall heterodetermination, meaning monopolizing the discourse. 
Accordingly, the aim of this section is to introduce a twofold enigma. If the EU constitutes a legal 
order founded in values, such as the rule of law and human rights, it is also important to (re)read the 
political discourse accordingly. In the case of Asylum and Immigration law policies holding great 
controversies but also cruciality for the integration process, the legislature and the judiciary ought to 
safeguard primary law. 
Conclusion  
Notwithstanding the rejection of formal constitutionalism within the EU, the small c (Shaw, 2017), 
manifests a factual hierarchy of norms. As repeatedly declared by the Court3  during the Heroic Period 
(Wiler, 1991), it is not only the constitutional charter4 but also the reality and the very essence of a 
provision that manifest the constitutional significance of a matter, such as the rule of law, the sincere 
cooperation, or even entire policy areas, such as the internal market or the area of freedom, security 
and justice. This is internally observed in Article 6 TEU, where international agreements and 
constitutional traditions are elevated to the level of constitutional supremacy. More interestingly and 
based on the above multi-faceted sources of inspiration, the rule of law in this excursus of comparative 
constitutionalism entails several components that realize liberty and the respect of human rights. 
Liberal constitutionalism symbolizes a political community owned by the people, within which 
fundamental norms such as human rights, play a principal role and within which there is always a 
question of fairness, justice, and effectiveness. In the European normative order, the endeavours of 
modern constitutional scholarchy, challenge the power of supranational political institutions by 
demoting the formal structure and promote cohesion. The European legal order is a very clear 
example where this type of interaction between norms and norm-making occur and mutate. And 
significantly, the Area of Freedom Security and Justice creates a subfield of this mutation. The impact 
of the policies on the individual (Thym, 2016), be it the EU citizen or the persecuted individual, as 
well as the State as such, advance them to the core of the legal order.  
Liberal constitutionalism either descriptively or normatively comprise of governmental institutions 
and powers, notwithstanding its inherent grievances balances popular sovereignty in an operational 
 
3 See: Case 294/83, Les Verts, ECLI:EU:C:1986:166, para. 23; A. Rosas and L. Armati, p. 37. 
4 See: Les Verts, ft. 2. 
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manner. It does so to preserve its own tools and ideals, namely individual liberty, non-discrimination, 
and the rule of law. The rule of law offers the comprehensive disciplinary proprium behind the 
inherent divergence of twenty seven legal orders, in view of legitimizing the exercise of supranational 
public authority. Hence it is the very acquis to defend (Kochenov, 2019a), the absence of which 
renders customs or monetary union pointless (Bogdany, 2009) and in the long term deemed to fail 
(Bartels, 2009).  
Primary EU law defends the disadvantaged (Mestmacker, 1994) who mostly fear the implications of 
disengagement from the assurance of human rights and the rule of law. In that sense, EU law pulls 
matters out of the exclusive grip of politics and negotiation and subjects them to a system of 
integration through law. The fragmentary and sparely written character of the Treaties appointees the 
Court to pave the way. The Court’s interpretative methodology has upright functional consequences 
for fashioning political choices about the nature of the policies, i.e., the policies on border checks, 
asylum, and immigration. Replacing national regulation with a single EU model carries a profound 
re-regulatory potential. Policing has sharpened under the claim to have created a system of special 
protection through the means of supremacy and direct effect, supplemented by State and private 
liability and imbued by the principles of good administration and fundamental rights (Habermas, 
2015).  
On the contrary, populism encompasses a series of concepts and initiatives that put into retrospection 
the above values. It questions their existence, their creation, and/or their validity. It stores resentment 
against dissenting statements but ultimately contradicts itself by trusting the same accused institutions 
for its hijacking into political hierarchy. Ironically, democracy is indeed destiny (Howse, 2019), 
learns its lessons and reverses even the most painfully losing battles. 
In normative terms, although an obscure and diverse term, populism is also a discourse and a strategy 
that can be classified in the following mutations: 
i. populism as democratic determinator, i.e., popular sovereignty, unreconcilable social antagonism; 
ii.  populism as a means to achieve political aims, i.e., sovereignty; 
iii. populism as substantial ideology relying on certain beliefs, i.e., against elites (Kaltwasser et al. 
2018).  
By and large, it is of lesser value which mutation applies in every particular case, as they mostly tend 
to overlap. It is, nevertheless, essential to acknowledge how intrusive populism is in the liberal status 
quo (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2018). It induces “ideational” hatred among social partners, targets the 
foreigner and poisons tolerance and inclusion. The division among “the pure people” versus “the 
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corrupt elite,” therefore, affects not only the institutional balance in the domestic and the 
supranational level, under the claim of “popular” (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2018) sovereignty 
precedence, but most importantly deprives the individual from the refuge to an independent judicial 
body. 
The moralized form of anti-pluralism and antagonism is not always clear from the outset. It 
recognizes, nevertheless, in almost all cases, the citizens as the only source of legitimacy, by 
delegitimising established authorities and mechanisms staffed by and serving the elites.  
Implications and Recommendations 
As promised in the introduction, the approach in this section will be more confident and future 
oriented. Not aligning with the very common habit of utterly identifying “elephants in the room,” the 
main argument hither is that there is enough and adequate legislation to address populism. 
First, Article 7 TEU mediates between societal and legal discourses concerning backsliding in the 
rule of law within the domestic legal order. For much of the academic literature (and unsurprisingly 
for the politicians) the procedure is “dead”, as not only has it been inactive in several instances where 
it appeared applicable, but also it has led to another quid pro quo rather political features or bilateral 
(Kochenov, 2019b: 5) nexuses in the already complex multilevel institutional relations. Further, the 
procedure as such is rather complicated but still a realistic option in the cases presented above.  
It contains the following procedural steps, chronologically interdependent:  
i. Reasoned proposal by one third of the Member States, by the European Parliament or by 
the European Commission 
ii. Hearing of the Member State’s authorities 
iii. Recommendations on the alleged issues, if possible 
iv. Council’s determination of a “clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the 
values referred to in Article 2 TEU” after consent of the European Parliament thereon. 
v. Observations by the Member States on the “persistent breach” of the values enshrined in 
Article 2 TEU 
vi. Council’s determination of the existence of a “serious and persistent breach” by unanimity 
rule, after a proposal by one third of the Member States or by the Commission  
vii. Decision on suspension of voting and other rights in the Council by a qualified majority, 
while Union law remains fully applicable and binding  
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 24/12/2020 05:49:11 |
HAPSc Policy Briefs Series                                      ISSN: 2732-6578 (print version) 2732-6586 (online) 
 
vol. 1 | no. 1 | June 2020    
35 
viii. Revocation of the punitive measures following pertinent assessment of the situation and 
the eagerness and success of the national authorities in addressing the determined 
breaches.  
While inflexible in terms of the necessary majorities, the concept signifies a fine border line beyond 
which derogations from the very core of the EU cannot be tolerated. It also holds a self-precautionary 
effect of what the Union aspires to be by portrays of a stigmatizing effect to the “foreign body” within 
the same “Union” (Kochenov, 2019b: 6), more intensively than the infringement proceedings can do. 
In the two current cases of the Polish and Hungarian regimes, the packaging of discontent in policy 
areas implicitly conferred to the Union, formed an uncontrollable nativist, anti-liberal stance, flirting 
with substantial coup by irrationally evoking the popular element as the sole legitimizing factor of 
clearly unconstitutional, fundamental rights-restrictive initiatives. Either way, it appears to be the sole 
recourse, as contrarily to the enforcement mechanism of Articles 258 - 260 TFEU, within the 
framework of general principles of EU law there is no other effective mechanism (Kochenov, 2017). 
From another perspective, the main actors of the political realm, the political parties are themselves 
bound by Article 2 TEU. Regulation 1141/2014 on the statute and funding of European political 
parties and European political foundations (EU-Euratom, 2014) requires full adherence to the values 
enshrined in Article 2 TEU for the funding of European political parties and European political 
foundations en bloc. Although contested (Morijn, 2019), the opting for a legal act of general 
application, binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States5 sends a clear message 
on the significance of the issue for the EU democratic project. During the values verification 
mechanism the adherence to the value package is tested6. “Manifest and serious breach” in the course 
of “programme and activities”7 as a standard of review seems to correspond to the aforementioned 
case of Article 7 TEU. It is unlikely to explicitly contravene Article 2 TEU. It is therefore necessary 
to ensure policy implementation in that value direction.  
Whether the adherence to the rule of law is destiny (Howse, 2019) remains unsure and of 
unpredictable durability. Safeguard mechanisms in the judicial proceedings for individuals and 
assurance of their enforcement by the institutions and the Member States themselves expands the 
horizons of policing towards a democratic ethos of self-control, introspection and openness. The EU 
overlooking of the undesirable effects of communautaire commitment does not affect only the 
backsliding countries, but also endangers the soundness of future measures, as well as disintegrates 
 
5 See: Article 288 para. 2.  
6 See: Recital 12, Articles 3(1)(c) and 3(2)(c).  
7 See: Article 3(1)(c). 
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the citizens from the Union. The self-vindication of the EU’s assertion to the rule of law, as per the 
first variable looming over the present study necessitates evidential materialization. 
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